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For Well over a century, efforts by numerous thinkers both Japanese and Western1 have continued to attempt to put the Jōdo Shinshū 浄土 
真宗 tradition into better conversation with global religious and philosophi-
cal traditions. Within this already complex history, Melissa Curley’s book 
offers a series of sophisticated new excursions into some of the Japanese 
thought over the centuries that has interacted, in more and less loosely 
defined ways, with “the” Pure Land tradition. Curley opens her study with 
panache:
For a thousand years, Japanese Buddhists cultivated vivid images 
of utopia in the form of the Western Paradise. In defiance of com-
mon sense, they insisted on the existence of a world unlike our 
own—a place of perfect ease and unrestricted access to liberation. 
The Pure Land constructed by Amida Buddha, Buddha of Limitless 
Light and Limitless Life, was the most powerful picture of shared 
happiness in the premodern Japanese imaginary. To imagine this 
1 For example, Kiyozawa Manshi 清沢満之 (1863–1903) and the Seishinshugi 精神主義 
movement, Alfred Bloom (1926–2017), and Dennis Hirota, among others. 
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utopia was also to make an assertion: things could be different; 
things could be better (p. 1). 
From the outset this links the Buddhist Pure Land to the semantics of 
(Western) utopia. Thus, following in particular from the inspiration of Ger-
man Marxist philosophers Theodor Adorno (1903–1969) and Ernst Bloch 
(1885–1977), Curley argues—working against an anti-utopian critique famil-
iar among twentieth-century Western thinkers—that it is rather the case that 
utopias (and ideas of exile and negation with which utopias are associated) 
are not so much about withdrawal from the world as they are actually cre-
ators of imaginative openings to the transformation of the real world. In the 
Japanese context, this sort of positive evaluation particularly contrasts with 
the commonly more suspicious handling of the “trans-worldly” Pure Land 
concept displayed, for example, in the modernist Kiyozawa 清沢 school.
Starting with this framework, Curley’s first chapter offers a rich, selec-
tive overview of how Pure Land ideas in Japan historically provided a 
complex imaginary which served varied needs ranging from folk religion 
to death ritual and ōjōden 往生伝 biographies to garden design. Review-
ing the versions of this mythos by Hōnen 法然 (1133–1212), Shinran 
親鸞 (1173–1263), and Rennyo 蓮如 (1415–1499)—especially attending to 
ambiguities about the spatial location of the Pure Land because situating it 
in the present world becomes important to her argument—Curley draws out 
elements that can be linked to exile, political resistance, egalitarian com-
munity, and utopia. A summary of the ikkō ikki 一向一揆 movements2 is 
accompanied by a long evaluation of the ōbō buppō 王法仏法 distinction3 
in Rennyo. Chapter 2 then takes up aspects of the movement known loosely 
as “Shin modernism.” Acutely aware of how new needs were created by 
the emergent Japanese nation-state, Curley develops a close reading of a 
key statement by Kōnyo 広如 (1798–1871), the twentieth hereditary head 
(monshu 門主) of Nishi Honganji 西本願寺, which explores the themes of 
privatization and separation of “religion” under conditions of coordina-
tion with the new state. The chapter includes a review of the effects of 
the Meiji 明治 Constitution, the contributions of Shimaji Mokurai 島地黙
雷 (1838–1911) in forming the new legal structure, and the implantation 
2 This term refers to a diverse set of local, often-militarized actions in the fifteenth and 
sixteenth centuries that were seeking autonomy from the earlier political system; they were 
put down with the unification of the country at the end of the sixteenth century.
3 This was a conceptualization of two domains of authority, the “kingly” or civil, and the 
“religious” or Buddhist.
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of a transformed private versus public dichotomy in Japanese conscious-
ness. Additionally, Curley surveys Kiyozawa Manshi, whom she likes 
for his exilic personal interiority, followed by discussions of other figures 
including Kaneko Daiei 金子大榮 (1881–1976), who treated the Pure 
Land in a new way inspired by nineteenth-century German philosophy, 
and Nonomura Naotarō 野々村直太郎 (1871–1946) and his deconstruc-
tion of the otherworldly Pure Land in the Nishi Honganji tradition; she 
then further provides some observations about Nishida Kitarō 西田幾多郎 
(1870–1945) and Kurata Hyakuzō 倉田百三 (1891–1943). As in the first 
chapter, the author highlights elements in this diversity that can be linked to 
exile, political resistance, egalitarian community, and utopia.
Chapters 3, 4, and 5 then deal in extensive detail with three twentieth-
century figures—Kawakami Hajime 河上肇 (1879–1946), Miki Kiyoshi 
三木清 (1897–1945), and Ienaga Saburō 家永三郎 (1913–2002)—who were 
all strongly invested in Western discourses but engaged with elements of 
Pure Land traditions in individual ways. 
Kawakami was a famed economist described by Curley as a “special 
Marxist, special Buddhist” who became one of the few intellectuals to 
never collaborate with the fascist state. Among Japanese Marxists, what 
made Kawakami really distinctive was his interest in “religion.” He had 
no family background of engagement with Buddhism, but had early attrac-
tions towards Christianity, Leo Tolstoy (1828–1910), and Itō Shōshin 伊藤
証信 (1876–1963), founder of the Muga-ai 無我愛 (Selfless Love) move-
ment, in connection with which he had a pivotal “religious experience” in 
1905 involving some kind of very personal ego-transcendence event. Later 
in his life during his prison episode in the 1930s, his attention returned to 
religion and this was related in his Gokuchū zeigo 獄中贅語 (Prison Ram-
blings, 1947). In this work, Kawakami posed questions about “religious 
truth” vis-à-vis science or how religious sectarianism could be bypassed. 
Determining that Zen 禅 and Shinshū 真宗 were essentially parallel despite 
their different languages of discourse, yet also that real religious truth was 
entirely different from, and maybe even opposed to, organized religion and 
its links to capitalism, he became convinced that the proletariat could be 
liberated from religion. Thus in Kawakami’s idiosyncratic, selective reading 
he saw Shinran as a political resister and interpreted the Pure Land as a free 
space within the self, in Curley’s analysis becoming Marxist on the outside 
but Buddhist on the inside, with both of these truths set against the state. In 
brief, through Pure Land he found a “self ” at the bottom of no-self, which 
Curley identifies as a “private utopia” (p. 120).
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In contrast, Miki was a more socially active intellectual whose politi-
cal career and relationships with Marxism and the imperial state were 
ambiguous. Miki’s interest in Pure Land thought emerged in an incom-
plete essay on Shinran found posthumously among his papers. Rather than 
representing an end-of-life turn towards a traditional religious orientation, 
however, Curley argues that the essay is primarily an interpretation of 
Marx. In Miki, Shinran was definitely a historical subject who had a close 
affinity with the proletariat; the progression of the ages of the Dharma 
described a dialectical history (à la Hegel and Marx); and the classical 
Pure Land three vows of Amida could also be given a dialectical reading. 
So Shinran was distinguished not only by his deep personal interiority (a 
quality echoed in figures like Kiyozawa Manshi or Kurata Hyakuzō) but 
also more unconventionally by his distinct embedment in a history with a 
progressive social potentiality. In this vein, Amida Buddha was an Abso-
lute historical spirit uniting the individual and the universe (an especially 
Hegelian aspect), and through the nenbutsu 念仏 persons could become 
self-conscious historical subjects. The Pure Land best stood for the earthly 
fellowship of practitioners who, living in equality, actualized a new form 
of kyōdōtai 共同体 ( gemeinschaft), in short, a “Pure Land for the people” (p. 
121). Notably, Miki had a turn to ethno-nationalism in the 1940s which led 
critics to accuse his ideas of kyōdōtai of being in actuality a reflection of the 
Japanese imperial state. 
The last figure highlighted is Ienaga, a non-Marxist thinker standing in 
contrast to both of the others, famed for court battles over textbooks, who 
maintained a stubborn sense of his own identity, understanding himself as 
“homeless” (without furusato 故郷). In that sensibility, Curley finds Ienaga’s 
discourse closest to the European sense of exile expressed in Adorno. 
The most fundamentally anti-authoritarian of her three primary figures, 
Ienaga treated Buddhism, similarly to Marxism, as a kind of intellectual 
resource for the criticism of modern Japan. Ienaga’s views about “the logic 
of negation,” which became known in English via a notable mediation by 
Robert Bellah (1927–2013),4 sprang out of an early encounter with a clas-
sical phrase associated with Shōtoku Taishi 聖徳太子 (574–622). Unlike 
Kawakami or Miki, Ienaga took a strong view about the need for a “nega-
tion” of phenomenal experience (i.e., in contrast to an emphasis on positive 
affirmation of such experience), locating in that way the real “transcendence” 
4 Bellah 1965. His essay mined a similar modern vein of accentuating the possibilities of 
“Kamakura Buddhism.” 
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of the Pure Land, bringing him in this respect closer to conventional main-
stream Buddhism. Again, unlike Kawakami or Miki, Ienaga was interested 
in the concrete historical situatedness of Shinran in the Kamakura period. 
He thought that era’s instability opened up large audiences to the meaning 
of negation, expressed for example in the prevalence of ōjōden biographies, 
and maintained that Shinran represented a real radicalism. However, after 
the Sengoku 戦国 period (1467–1615) ended, he held that Japanese people 
became materialistic and lost much of their earlier critical sensibility, so 
that the subsequent Tokugawa 徳川 period (1603–1868) represented a total 
submission to power. Distinctively, a large part of Ienaga’s writing was a 
non-nationalist critical dialogue with Japanese cultural nationalism in which 
Ienaga strongly connected Shinran’s thought with a responsibility to dis-
sent.
In her final overview, Curley reemphasizes that “Pure Land” in Japan had 
a long connection with dissent, resistance, and alternative community. 
As a world set in opposition to this one, the image of the Pure 
Land retains a certain critical capacity. Each of the sectarian 
Shin modernists we have considered here interrogates this criti-
cal capacity in some way, whether restraining it or amplifying it. 
Their modernizing efforts not only shaped the institution, they 
also shaped the content of tradition in important ways. Thus when 
Kawakami, Miki, and Ienaga seized upon the Shinshū tradition 
at a moment of danger, they were working with both the affor-
dances and constraints of Shin modernism, orthodox and hetero-
dox. Reading the stock of Japanese Buddhist tradition against the 
present reality of the imperial nation-state, Kawakami, Miki, and 
Ienaga each attempted to imagine a Pure Land that had not been 
captured by the state; this act of imagination itself constituted a 
form of resistance to the totalizing impulse of imperialist nation-
alism. And although their resistance was informed by the modern 
utopianism of Marxist thought, putting the Pure Land to use as an 
image of resistance to the real was in its way deeply traditional (p. 
190).
And:
If Mahāyāna Buddhism offers a valuable foundation for think-
ing about transindividuality, or relation-based doctrine, Shinshū 
offers a uniquely robust set of resources for thinking from the 
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periphery. It is a tradition deeply invested in cultivating an imagi-
native identification with the abject. Shinran’s exile positions the 
founder as excluded from the center; his affirmation of himself 
as neither monk nor layman makes this exclusion permanent; and 
the doctrine of akunin shōki [悪人正機] makes the evil person’s 
exclusion from liberation the pivot on which salvation turns (pp. 
193–94).
Curley’s conclusion mentions that her selected thinkers were not alone in 
the twentieth century in proposing “relationalist” hybridizations of Marx-
ist and Buddhist ideas—other philosophers such as Michael Ryan (1951–), 
Étienne Balibar (1942–), and Hiromatsu Wataru 広松涉 (1933–1994) can 
be identified—and she proposes that the implications of such intersections 
between Buddhist ideas and Marxist critiques of nation-state capitalism 
might actively continue. Through them Japan might achieve a more just 
view of global socio-economics by regarding Asia (again, as once in the 
past) as a “periphery” from which it might be more possible to launch alter-
natives. 
It is impossible to do justice to a work of this extreme richness in a 
review article. Perhaps the book can be described as a Western scholar’s 
Marxist-inflected, personalized, creative, amalgamative exploration of 
intertwined ideas about the Pure Land, utopias, and exile, generated by 
selectively sweeping through historical topics in Japanese Buddhism fitted 
out with a wealth of reference to contemporary Western thinkers. 
Yet as well as offering a quite challenging read in its own terms, the book 
stimulates reflection on the contingency of meaning. Stepping back a bit 
from the book’s details, its key message—though handled rather implicitly 
(Curley is aware of the mobility and reassignment of symbolic values [pp. 
7–11] but does not expand on this theme per se)—is the interpretability 
of Buddhist language. From a semantic point of view, the long-running 
historical treatment of “Pure Land” could be seen as a chain of floating 
significations, simultaneously accommodating the multi-directionality of 
historical ideas while claiming continuities of meaning. Now, certainly 
Buddhist studies has long been familiar with notions of hermeneutics—
the drawing out and expansion of meanings from texts. However, in the 
context here, while hermeneutics is often associated with digging out one 
“essential” core meaning or another from a tradition of texts or discourses, 
on the farther end of the spectrum of interpretability and meaning exists 
something more radical which is now familiar in twentieth-century linguis-
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tics and critical theory. This “floating signification” puts the weight less on 
interpretability than on the arbitrariness, looseness, historical mobility, and 
contextuality of meanings that can be associated with given items of speech 
and imagination. Thus, regarding the Pure Land “tradition,” James Dobbins 
has written that “Pure Land has operated [in many cases] as an amorphous 
and open-ended collection of themes without a cohesive center. It is as if 
the Pure Land discourse can function as an open semantic field in which 
a wide variety of beliefs, doctrines, and religious claims can plant their 
meaning.”5 Fluid signification becomes especially obvious when it crosses 
cultural boundaries. It is impossible to deal with the interactions of “Asian 
religions” with the West without this awareness. Actual religious traditions 
in history have tended to be three-way negotiations among some traditional 
line, or lines, of intellectual (and/or institutional) grounding, some floating 
signification processes (cross-cultural or otherwise), and some merchandis-
ing to a market (in which case the “grounding” aspect by no means neces-
sarily has the upper hand). 
With this perspective in mind, it might be suggested that there are won-
derfully interesting tensions in Curley’s presentation. The author’s project of 
amalgamating meanings around utopia and exile involves a re-signification 
of Pure Land language around European philosophical ideas and Japanese 
who had engaged these ideas, more than around classical Buddhist thought 
or thinkers (the book contains almost nothing expounding what would be 
considered classical Buddhist philosophy). To say so is not necessarily a 
critique, but the project therefore contains a range of assumptions about 
undefined key terms which are heavily overdetermined in the English lan-
guage: utopia, secularization, transcendence, and the modern. Outside of 
these, even the Pure Land is not really given plain exposition in its clas-
sical Buddhist context as a karmic transition zone (or as ultimate bodhi in 
Shinran). The ideal reader of the work needs an extraordinary fund of prior 
knowledge about all these matters.
Historically, at least at the behavioral level, there has existed a multi-
directionality and ambiguity within the “core” Shinranian (and then Ren-
nyovian) discourse itself. Curley wants to highlight anti-authoritarianism 
and egalitarianism, but the core also contains a “responsibilityism” found in 
acute hansei 反省 (self-criticism), leading to a quietism within the individ-
ual, ambivalence about the social effects of karma, a heavy component of 
familial/ancestral consciousness, and especially the collective appeal which 
5 Dobbins 2006, pp. 417–18. 
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produced the deep commitments to the proprietary community institutions 
of the enormously successful two principal Honganji traditions. These insti-
tutions proceeded over the centuries to sometimes fight with, but most other 
times to collaborate and negotiate with, political power. 
“Secularism” in the modern period problematized older Pure Land thought 
about the Pure Land but remains a fraught term. Often, secularization 
connotes some unproblematized “empirical science” which stands in some 
kind of contrastive or oppositional relation to religion, but this ignores 
longstanding debate (quite pertinent to Buddhism) to the effect that science 
(like reality, modernity, rationality, or the supernatural) can be as hard to 
define as religion and is the subject of a large field called philosophy of sci-
ence. Otherwise, the term “secularization” is on firmest ground when used 
for a discussion of the effects of the formation of the nation-state, which 
produced the Meiji Constitution and the generation of categories such as 
shūkyō 宗教 (“religion”) and even Bukkyō 仏教 (Buddhism). In this relation, 
Curley’s close reading of Kōnyo excellently develops the idea that post-
Meiji Shin became differentiated from politics in a different manner than in 
the Tokugawa period, as newly sharpened distinctions of private and social 
enter the picture, isolating and subordinating what becomes classified as 
religious. 
That modern nation-state had a huge impact in restructuring epistemolog-
ical and political fields. In this environment, Kawakami, Miki, and Ienaga 
operated in a twentieth-century environment in which the “existence,” and 
thus importance, of the “otherworldly” Pure Land was being discounted 
among intellectuals, and especially outside the traditional sect proper, this 
transforming environment—combined with the several kinds of potentiali-
ties which were already long since structured into the teaching—opened up 
the signifier of the Pure Land to new, unconventional appropriations by new 
interests. Yet what these men were seeking in Buddhism seems to have been 
primarily the ways it was like their twentieth-century Marxism or dissident 
anti-nationalism.
Hence, in short, claims for progressive potentialities in “Shinshū” seem 
to be highly ambiguous. As cited above, the author proposes that Shinshū 
“offers a uniquely robust set of resources for thinking from the periphery,” 
starting with Shinran’s exile and its identification with the abject and con-
tinuing with some elements of the tradition’s historical practice. However, 
this is a treatment of the record that is filtered for elements to support a 
broadly “political” reading which puts aside much of what actually hap-
pened in the history of “Shinshū.” The most “robust” manifestation of 
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Shin politics in early modern and then twentieth-century Japan has been 
what we would call today a center-right social conservatism. This was dis-
played most painfully in the strong collaboration of Shin Buddhism with 
the Japanese imperial project circa 1905–1945, something which has been 
remarkably underplayed in the non-Japanese perception of Shin. (In view 
of the activism in that twentieth-century experience, the description of even 
conservative Shin as generally “other-worldly” contains complex ironies.) 
So, while it is a fact of pre-1945 twentieth-century Japanese history that 
the leftists and communists were the significant political groups to push 
back seriously hard against militarism, it is obscure how Kawakami’s or 
Miki’s late-life ideas may be considered representative and/or important, or 
in terms of concrete events, as more than marginal in the stream of either 
Marxism or Buddhism.
The above points of tension may seem scattered. However, they each 
problematize the broad picture Curley aims to paint. The intensity of mod-
ern change in Japan tends to be obscured by the “invented tradition” qual-
ity of so much modern Japanese cultural depiction, depiction which may 
include notions that Shinran’s Buddhist discourse of the twelfth century 
can be unproblematically understood as providing some timeless continu-
ities over the past seven hundred plus years—from Rennyo, to sengoku, 
to the Tokugawa-period mibun seido 身分制度 (status system), to modern 
transnational capitalism, to the pre-1945 tennōsei 天皇制・ (emperor sys-
tem), to postwar Shin-style “liberalism.” As an eminent historian, Cur-
ley is clearly aware of all these facts and factors. However, her creative 
project is different: it is to curate an optimistic intervention from North 
America into Pure Land thought. Yes, her productive thinkers layered 
their ideas onto several modern Japanese intellectual trends, which were 
layered (sometimes in an allergic manner) onto early modern Pure Land 
thought, which was layered onto Rennyo, which was layered onto Kakunyo 
覚如 (1270–1351) and Zonkaku 存覚 (1290–1373), which was layered onto 
Shinran, which was layered onto pieces of earlier Pure Land (and Tendai 
天台) tradition filtered through Japan, China, and India. But her goal is to 
tell a positive, nourishing, and reinvigorated story. That the story reveals 
cognitive dissonances in the potentialities which can be accommodated 
under the label “Pure Land Buddhism” is unavoidable. 
This is an English-language book. What is the best audience for capital-
izing on the malleability of signification in Pure Land? Perhaps Curley’s is 
an innovative project which despite being composed from North America 
is really aimed at making a contribution to Japan, inasmuch as something 
T H E  E A S T E R N  B U D D H I S T  4 9 ,  1  &  2258
about “Pure Land” continues to offer a “native” resource for Japan due to 
the simple fact of it being Japanese. For non-Japanese, on the other hand, as 
with other aspects of Asian Buddhist traditions that can be deemed some-
what “progressive,” the interest is usually in how it might be demonstrated 
that there is some significant advantage in discovering an alternative onto-
epistemic basis in Buddhism compared to “the West.” However, if non-
Japanese are seeking positively distinctive resources for social justice or 
something like progressive politics, it remains to be seen if “Pure Land” by 
any interpretation provides anything broadly unfamiliar or innovative to the 
mass of now global critiques of the modern nation-state, capitalism, con-
sumerism, inequality, and so forth, which have developed over the past two 
hundred years. For a long time, the writer of this review himself pursued a 
notion that if only more non-Japanese people knew what the resources of 
the Japanese “Pure Land” were and are, significantly more of them would 
be interested in engaging and exploring it. But perhaps the non-philosoph-
ical sort of observers among non-Japanese over the last century and a half 
have not been entirely wrong to react to Pure Land as relatively uninterest-
ing for the purposes of anyone outside Japan. Still, alternatively, perhaps 
Curley’s bountiful study can, after all, indeed energize and inspire the Eng-
lish-language world to reexamine these resources in Japanese Buddhism.
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